Ruling Out Multiplicity of Smooth Equilibria in Dynamic Games: A Hyperbolic Discounting Example

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Title: Ruling Out Multiplicity of Smooth Equilibria in Dynamic Games: A Hyperbolic Discounting Example
Authors: Maliar, Lilia | Maliar, Serguei
Research Group/s: Análisis Económico
Center, Department or Service: Universidad de Alicante. Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico
Keywords: Hyperbolic discounting | Quasi-geometric discounting | Time inconsistency | Markov perfect equilibrium | Markov games | Turnpike theorem | Neoclassical growth model | Endogenous gridpoints | Envelope condition
Knowledge Area: Fundamentos del Análisis Económico
Issue Date: Jun-2016
Publisher: Springer Science+Business Media New York
Citation: Dynamic Games and Applications. 2016, 6(2): 243-261. doi:10.1007/s13235-015-0177-8
Abstract: The literature that conducts numerical analysis of equilibrium in models with hyperbolic (quasi-geometric) discounting reports difficulties in achieving convergence. Surprisingly, numerical methods fail to converge even in a simple, deterministic optimal growth problem that has a well-behaved, smooth closed-form solution. We argue that the reason for nonconvergence is that the generalized Euler equation has a continuum of smooth solutions, each of which is characterized by a different integration constant. We propose two types of restrictions that can rule out the multiplicity: boundary conditions and shape restrictions on equilibrium policy functions. With these additional restrictions, the studied numerical methods deliver a unique smooth solution for both the deterministic and stochastic problems in a wide range of the model’s parameters.
Sponsor: Lilia Maliar and Serguei Maliar acknowledge support from the Hoover Institution and Department of Economics at Stanford University, University of Alicante, Santa Clara University and MECD Grant ECO2012-36719.
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10045/62608
ISSN: 2153-0785 (Print) | 2153-0793 (Online)
DOI: 10.1007/s13235-015-0177-8
Language: eng
Type: info:eu-repo/semantics/article
Rights: © Springer Science+Business Media New York 2015. The final publication is available at Springer via http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s13235-015-0177-8
Peer Review: si
Publisher version: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s13235-015-0177-8
Appears in Collections:INV - Análisis Económico - Artículos de Revistas

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