Federal tax policies, congressional voting and natural resources
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Título: | Federal tax policies, congressional voting and natural resources |
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Autor/es: | Pérez Sebastián, Fidel | Raveh, Ohad |
Grupo/s de investigación o GITE: | Análisis Económico |
Centro, Departamento o Servicio: | Universidad de Alicante. Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico |
Palabras clave: | Federal tax changes | Natural resources | Voting behavior | Federalism |
Área/s de conocimiento: | Fundamentos del Análisis Económico |
Fecha de publicación: | ago-2019 |
Editor: | Wiley |
Cita bibliográfica: | Canadian Journal of Economics / Revue canadienne d'économique. 2019, 52(3): 1112-1164. doi:10.1111/caje.12404 |
Resumen: | Can abundance of natural resources affect legislators' voting behaviour over federal tax policies? We construct a political economy model of a federalized economy with district heterogeneity in natural resource abundance. The model shows that representatives of natural resource‐rich districts are more (less) willing to vote in favour of federal tax increases (decreases). This occurs because resource‐rich districts are less responsive to federal tax changes due to the immobile nature of their natural resources. We test the model's predictions using data on roll‐call votes in the US House of Representatives over the major federal tax bills initiated during the period of 1945–2003, in conjunction with the presence of active giant oil fields in US congressional districts. Our identification strategy rests on plausibly exogenous giant oil field discoveries and exploitation and narrative‐based aggregate federal tax shocks that are exogenous to individual congressional districts and legislators. We find that: (i) resource‐rich congressional districts are less responsive to changes in federal taxes and (ii) representatives of resource‐rich congressional districts are more (less) supportive of federal tax increases (decreases), controlling for legislator, congressional district and state indicators. Our results indicate that resource richness is approximately half as dominant as the main determinant, namely party affiliation, in driving legislators' voting behaviour over federal tax policies. |
Patrocinador/es: | Perez-Sebastian gratefully acknowledges financial support from Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad and Fondo Europeo de Desarrollo Regional (ECO2015-70540-P MINECO/FEDER). Raveh gratefully acknowledges financial support from the Center for Agricultural Economic Research. |
URI: | http://hdl.handle.net/10045/95647 |
ISSN: | 0008-4085 (Print) | 1540-5982 (Online) |
DOI: | 10.1111/caje.12404 |
Idioma: | eng |
Tipo: | info:eu-repo/semantics/article |
Derechos: | © Canadian Economics Association |
Revisión científica: | si |
Versión del editor: | https://doi.org/10.1111/caje.12404 |
Aparece en las colecciones: | INV - Análisis Económico - Artículos de Revistas |
Archivos en este ítem:
Archivo | Descripción | Tamaño | Formato | |
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2019_Perez-Sebastian_Raveh_CanadJEcon_final.pdf | Versión final (acceso restringido) | 1,63 MB | Adobe PDF | Abrir Solicitar una copia |
2019_Perez-Sebastian_Raveh_CanadJEcon_preprint.pdf | Preprint (acceso abierto) | 2,65 MB | Adobe PDF | Abrir Vista previa |
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