The complete information first-price auction or the importance of being indivisible

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10045/4506
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dc.contributorGrupo de Estudios de Paz y Desarrolloen
dc.contributor.authorAlcalde, Jose-
dc.contributor.authorDahm, Matthias-
dc.contributor.otherUniversidad de Alicante. Instituto Universitario de Desarrollo Social y Pazen
dc.contributor.otherUniversidad de Alicante. Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económicoen
dc.contributor.otherUniversitat Rovira i Virgili. Departament d'Economiaen
dc.date.accessioned2008-03-05T12:49:27Z-
dc.date.available2008-03-05T12:49:27Z-
dc.date.created2008-02-27-
dc.date.issued2008-03-05T12:49:27Z-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10045/4506-
dc.description.abstractDespite the popularity of auction theoretical thinking, it appears that no one has presented an elementary equilibrium analysis of the First-price sealed-bid auction mechanism under complete information. This paper aims to remedy that omission.en
dc.description.sponsorshipThe authors' work is partially supported by the Institut Valencià d'Investigacions Econòmiques. Alcalde acknowledges support by FEDER and the Spanish Ministerio de Educación y Ciencia under project SEJ2007-62656/ECON. Dahm acknowledges financial support by the Departament d'Universitats, Recerca i Societat de la Informació (Generalitat de Catalunya) under project 2005SGR00949 and by the Spanish Ministerio de Educación y Ciencia under project SEJ2005-04085/ECON.en
dc.languageengen
dc.subjectFirst-price auctionsen
dc.subjectUndominated Nash equilibriaen
dc.subject.otherFundamentos del Análisis Económicoen
dc.titleThe complete information first-price auction or the importance of being indivisibleen
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaperen
dc.peerreviewednoen
dc.rights.accessRightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess-
Appears in Collections:INV - GEPYD - Artículos de Revistas
INV - DMCTE - Artículos de Revistas

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