Production-inventory games: A new class of totally balanced combinatorial optimization games

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Título: Production-inventory games: A new class of totally balanced combinatorial optimization games
Autor/es: Guardiola, Luis A. | Meca, Ana | Puerto, Justo
Centro, Departamento o Servicio: Universidad de Alicante. Departamento de Matemáticas
Palabras clave: Production-inventory games | Totally balanced combinatorial optimization games | Core-allocations | Owen-allocations | Monotonicity rules
Fecha de publicación: 30-mar-2007
Editor: Elsevier
Cita bibliográfica: Games and Economic Behavior. 2009, 65(1): 205-219. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2007.02.003
Resumen: In this paper we introduce a new class of cooperative games that arise from production-inventory problems. Several agents have to cover their demand over a finite time horizon and shortages are allowed. Each agent has its own unit production, inventory-holding and backlogging cost. Cooperation among agents is given by sharing production processes and warehouse facilities: agents in a coalition produce with the cheapest production cost and store with the cheapest inventory cost. We prove that the resulting cooperative game is totally balanced and the Owen set reduces to a singleton: the Owen point. Based on this type of allocation we find a population monotonic allocation scheme for this class of games. Finally, we point out the relationship of the Owen point with other well-known allocation rules such as the nucleolus and the Shapley value.
Patrocinador/es: The research of the authors is partially supported by Spanish Ministry of Science and Technology grants number: BFM2004-0909, HA2003-0121, MTM2005-09184-C02-02, SEC2002-00112.
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10045/140481
ISSN: 0899-8256 (Print) | 1090-2473 (Online)
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2007.02.003
Idioma: eng
Tipo: info:eu-repo/semantics/article
Derechos: © 2007 Elsevier Inc.
Revisión científica: si
Versión del editor: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2007.02.003
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