Group decisions from individual rankings: The Borda–Condorcet rule
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http://hdl.handle.net/10045/112281
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Camp Dublin Core | Valor | Idioma |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor | Análisis Económico | es_ES |
dc.contributor.author | Herrero, Carmen | - |
dc.contributor.author | Villar Notario, Antonio | - |
dc.contributor.other | Universidad de Alicante. Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico | es_ES |
dc.date.accessioned | 2021-01-24T17:10:44Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2021-01-24T17:10:44Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2021-06-01 | - |
dc.identifier.citation | European Journal of Operational Research. 2021, 291(2): 757-765. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2020.09.043 | es_ES |
dc.identifier.issn | 0377-2217 (Print) | - |
dc.identifier.issn | 1872-6860 (Online) | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10045/112281 | - |
dc.description.abstract | This paper presents an evaluation protocol that transforms a collection of rankings, defined over a set of alternatives, into a complete, transitive, and cardinal assessment. It combines the ideas of Borda and Condorcet by computing the support that each alternative receives on average when confronted with any other. The protocol evaluates those alternatives in terms of pairwise comparisons but weighs the outcomes differently depending on how each alternative fares with respect to the others. The evaluation appears as the stable distribution of an iterative process in which each alternative competes randomly with any other, and results in a vector of positive numbers that tells us the relative support of the different options. We show that this protocol does not require linear orderings and can also be applied in the presence of incomplete rankings and when dealing with several issues simultaneously. | es_ES |
dc.description.sponsorship | The first author acknowledges financial support from the Spanish Ministerio de Economía, Industria y Competitividad under project ECO2015-65820P, IMeRA, and Generalitat Valenciana, PROMETEO 2019/037. The second author recognizes financial support from the Spanish Ministerio de Economía, Industria y Competitividad under project ECO2015–65408-R (MINECO/FEDER). | es_ES |
dc.language | eng | es_ES |
dc.publisher | Elsevier | es_ES |
dc.rights | © 2020 Elsevier B.V. | es_ES |
dc.subject | Evaluation function | es_ES |
dc.subject | Multiple rankings | es_ES |
dc.subject | Borda and Condorcet rules | es_ES |
dc.subject | Stable distributions | es_ES |
dc.subject | Incomplete rankings | es_ES |
dc.subject.other | Fundamentos del Análisis Económico | es_ES |
dc.title | Group decisions from individual rankings: The Borda–Condorcet rule | es_ES |
dc.type | info:eu-repo/semantics/article | es_ES |
dc.peerreviewed | si | es_ES |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1016/j.ejor.2020.09.043 | - |
dc.relation.publisherversion | https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2020.09.043 | es_ES |
dc.rights.accessRights | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess | es_ES |
dc.relation.projectID | info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/MINECO//ECO2015-65820-P | - |
dc.relation.projectID | info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/MINECO//ECO2015-65408-R | - |
Apareix a la col·lecció: | INV - Análisis Económico - Artículos de Revistas |
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Herrero_Villar_2021_EurJOperatRes_final.pdf | Versión final (acceso restringido) | 445,51 kB | Adobe PDF | Obrir Sol·licitar una còpia |
Herrero_Villar_2021_EurJOperatRes_accepted.pdf | Accepted Manuscript (acceso abierto) | 1,84 MB | Adobe PDF | Obrir Vista prèvia |
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